Incentives to settle under joint and several liability
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Incentives to settle under joint and several liability an empirical analysis of superfund litigation by Howard F. Chang

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Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

Subjects:

  • Liability for hazardous substances pollution damages -- United States.,
  • Hazardous waste sites -- Law and legislation -- United States.,
  • Hazardous waste site remediation -- Law and legislation -- United States.,
  • Actions and defenses -- United States.,
  • Compromise (Law) -- United States.,
  • Costs (Law) -- United States.

Book details:

Edition Notes

Other titlesEmpirical analysis of superfund litigation
StatementHoward F. Chang, Hilary Sigman.
SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper 7096, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 7096.
ContributionsSigman, Hilary, 1964-, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsHB1 .W654 no. 7096
The Physical Object
Pagination40 p. ;
Number of Pages40
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL22400538M

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Recent theoretical research by Kornhauser and Revesz finds that joint and several liability may either encourage or discourage settlement, depending on the correlation of outcomes at trial across defendants. We extend their two‐defendant model to a richer framework with N defendants. This extension allows us to test the theoretical model empirically using data on Superfund by: INCENTIVES TO SETTLE UNDER JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY: AN. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SUPERFUND LITIGATION. HOWARD F. CHANG and HILARY SIGMAN'' ABSTRACT. Congress may soon restrict joint and several liability for cleanup of contaminated sites under Superfund. We explore whether this change would discourage settle­Cited by: "The incentive effects of settlements under joint and several liability," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages , December. Guilkey, David K. . Recent theoretical research by Kornhauser and Revesz finds that joint and several liability may either encourage or discourage settlement, depending on the correlation of outcomes at trial across defendants. We extend their two-defendant model to a richer framework with N defendants.

Congress may soon restrict joint and several liability for cleanup of contaminated sites under Superfund. We explore whether this change would discourage settlements and is therefore likely to increase the program 's already high litigation costs per site. Recent theoretical research by Kornhauser and Revesz finds that joint and several liability may either encourage or discourage settlement. Chang, Howard F. and Sigman, Hilary A., Incentives to Settle Under Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation (March ). Stanford Law School, Olin Law & Economics Paper No. ; U of Penn Law School, Law & Economics Paper No. . A State-by-State Guide to When Joint and Several Liability Arises This quick glance compendium serves as a reference tool for joint and several laws across the United States. The allocation of fault in cases is not simply who did what. State law variations affect whether a plaintiff may. Get this from a library! Incentives to settle under joint and several liability: an empirical analysis of superfund litigation. [Howard F Chang; Hilary Sigman; National Bureau of Economic Research.].

By Howard F. Chang and Hilary Sigman, Published on 01/01/ Article Title. Incentives to Settle under Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation.   1. PROPOSITION 3: If p is independent of x (and 0 E' (x) = (n - 1)Dq' (p - p2)/ [1 + p (n - 1)], which is negative because q'. As others have noted, the settlement effects of joint and several liability increase the expected recovery to the plaintiff and the expected damages payable by defendants. However, this does not mean that they increase defendants' incentives to take care ex ante. Joint and several liability coupled with a pro tanto set-off rule (under which, when the plaintiff settles with one defendant and litigates against the other, its claim against the non-settling.